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Book	Review:	Crashed:	How	a	decade	of	financial
crises	changed	the	world	by	Adam	Tooze	(Part	1)
In	Crashed:	How	a	decade	of	financial	crises	changed	the	world,	author	Adam	Tooze	proposes	a
remarkably	consistent	narrative	of	the	2008	financial	crisis	and	its	political,	geopolitical	consequences
—	one	that	attempts	a	coherent	interpretation	of	the	global	and	European	crises.	In	part	one	of	his
review	of	this	seminal	work,	Shahin	Vallée	examines	Tooze’s	take	on	the	collapse	of	the	financial
system,	and	saving	the	economy	at	the	cost	of	our	politics.	
Having	been	a	front	row	observer	of	the	financial	crisis	for	the	past	10	years,	when	Adam	Tooze’s	Crashed	came
out,	I	thought	that	I	could	do	away	with	reading	its	full	687	pages	(including	the	notes)	and	limit	myself	to	his	London
School	of	Economic	presentation.	I	was	wrong.	Tooze	has	the	annoying	habit	of	disseminating	important	thoughts
with	profound	ramifications	randomly	throughout	the	book.	This	means	you	can’t	go	through	the	outline	and	focus
only	on	the	parts	that	appear	central	to	his	argument.	The	book	proposes	a	remarkably	internally	consistent	narrative
of	the	crisis	and	its	political,	geopolitical	consequences—one	that	attempts	a	coherent	interpretation	of	the	global	and
European	crises,	something	that	10	years	after	the	failure	Lehman	Brothers	is	still	sorely	missing.	This	work	is	not
only	a	work	of	economic	history	but	one	that	mobilizes	all	social	sciences	with	enough	distance	to	debunk	the	myths
and	challenge	the	oracles	of	economics	and	finance,	along	with	references	ranging	from	Jay	Z	to	Jacques	Derrida
and	from	Bob	Dylan	to	Jurgen	Habermas.
Crashed:	How	a	decade	of	financial	crises	changed	the	world.	Adam	Tooze.	Allen	Lane	2018.	
The	international	monetary	and	financial	order
The	foundational	moment	of	the	collapse	of	Bretton	Woods	in	the	1970s	is
mentioned	in	passing	but	is,	for	Tooze,	clearly	central	to	understanding	the
evolution	of	international	finance	and	global	capitalism.	It	was	at	that	moment
that	both	the	free	flow	of	global	capital	and	the	development	of	a	fractional
reserve	banking	system	where	credit	creation	is	outsourced	to	the	private
banks	became	the	two	central	pillars	of	international	finance.	The	new
monetary	system	or	non-system	that	emerged	in	its	aftermath	would	plant	the
seeds	of	the	crises	of	global	financial	capitalism	of	2008.	The	expansion	of
finance	had	profound	consequences	on	the	geography	of	capital	and	trade
relations	allowing	for	financial	flows	to	rapidly	outpace	the	growth	in
international	trade,	a	development	that	would	disconnect	trade	imbalances	that
economists	have	followed	closely	for	decades	from	financial	imbalances.
Understanding	the	importance	of	this	macro-financial	link	is	critical	to
understanding	both	why	the	U.S.	and	European	crisis	are	tied	at	the	hips,	but
also	to	understand	the	ways	in	which	the	European	crisis	itself	developed.	As
Tooze	puts	it,	the	evolution	of	European	capitalism	had	been	such	that	by
2008,	Europe’s	idea	of	a	functioning	social	market	economy	was	in	reality
turbo-charged	financial	capitalism	(p.116)	powered	by	its	banking	system.
Understanding	this	phenomenon	is	critical	to	a	finer	understanding	of	the	euro	crisis	as	well,	because	while	it	is	clear
that	it	is	not	a	fiscal	or	competitiveness	crisis,	contrary	to	what	a	narrow	analysis	of	fiscal	accounts	and	trade	flows
would	suggest.	Indeed,	the	euro	crisis	was	not	just	about	the	recycling	in	Southern	Europe	of	current	account
surpluses	accumulated	in	Germany.	Understanding,	the	importance	of	leverage	in	the	banking	system	at	the	heart	of
a	process	of	exponentially	reallocating	and	recycling	current	account	surpluses	and	fuelling	capital	flows	offers	an
essential	perspective	to	understand	the	role	that	European	finance	played	in	this	crisis.	This	explains	why	a	country
like	France	with	relatively	little	current	account	surplus	became	centrally	enmeshed	both	in	the	global	as	well	as	the
Euro	financial	crises.
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This	point	is	quite	central	to	understanding	why	the	few	economists	(such	as	Roubini)		who	“predicted”	the	crisis,	in
reality,	predicted	the	wrong	crisis.	Indeed,	the	standard,	global	imbalances	view	centred	around	the	large	U.S.
current	account	deficit	and	Chinese	surplus,	the	so-called	Chimerica	view	of	the	world,	suggested	that	the	real	threat
was	a	crisis	of	the	dollar,	with	a	sudden-stop	on	the	part	of	America’s	creditors	affecting	the	United	States	and	the
world	economy.	This	is	not	what	happened.	In	effect,	while	global	imbalances	and	Chimerica	was	a	macro-economic
reality,	the	much	more	important	macro-financial	reality	was	the	development	of	North	Atlantic	Finance,	which	would
come	to	break	down	in	the	fall	of	2008	not	through	a	dollar	crisis	(in	which	everybody	sells	dollars)	as	predicted	but
through	a	dollar	funding	crisis	(in	which	everybody	wanted	dollars).	It	is	this	nexus	of	macro-financial	and	macro-
economic	imbalances	both	rooted	in	geopolitics	that	came	to	a	breaking	point	between	2008	and	2018.
The	Federal	Reserve	and	the	bailing	out	of	the	international	financial	system
As	a	result,	Tooze	rightly	points	to	the	central	nature	for	the	international	monetary	order	of	the	creation	of	a	dense	of
bilateral	swap	lines	(by	which	the	Federal	Reserve	lends	dollars	to	other	central	banks),	that	benefited	Europe	first
and	foremost.	As	one	European	Central	Banker	would	remark:	“we	became	the	thirteenth	district	of	the	Federal
Reserve	System”	(p215).	The	fact	that	this	network	has	become	permanent	despite	the	pressure	of	the	U.S.
Congress	to	curtail	it	by	way	of	the	Dodd-Frank	Act,	which	limited	the	discretionary	powers	of	the	Fed	in	times	of
crisis,	speaks	to	the	understanding	by	the	Federal	Reserve	of	its	resolute	international	role.	This	was	critical	in
stabilizing	the	financial	markets	and	delivering	dollar	liquidity	across	the	globe.	This	has	also	repaired	a	transatlantic
finance	and	allowed	in	effect	the	dollar	to	continue	to	reign	supreme	as	a	primus	inter	pares	international	reserve
currency.	The	secondary	network	of	swap	lines	has	demonstrated	its	importance,	too.	For	example,	the	ability	of	the
Reserve	Bank	of	India	to	draw	dollars	from	the	Bank	of	Japan	was	an	important	element	of	providing	some
secondary	stability	in	times	of	concerns	about	global	dollar	liquidity.	But	while	Tooze	shows	how	imperfect	these
arrangements	were	in	the	context	of	the	taper	tantrum,	when	the	prospect	of	the	end	of	Quantitative	Easing	rattled
financial	markets	in	2013	for	example,	he	doesn’t	stress	enough	the	two	fundamental	flaws	in	this	arrangement:	(a)
the	fact	that	it	leaves	China	and	the	PBoC	outside	of	this	network	and	therefore	exposed	to	potential	dollar	liquidity
shortages	and	(b)	that	it	leaves	the	system	to	rely	on	the	ability	of	each	member	of	the	swap	network	to	distribute	to
its	satellites.
As	we	saw	during	the	crisis,	the	ability	of	each	nod	in	the	system	to	play	the	role	of	intermediary	and	deliver	dollar
liquidity	to	its	respective	network	of	monetary	influence	is	uncertain,	subject	to	the	U.S.	discretion,	which	given	erratic
politics	can	be	withdrawn	and	therefore	leaves	the	system	unpredictable	and	vulnerable	to	regional	dollar	shortages.
The	start	of	the	hiking	cycle	and	dollar	shortages	and	capital	flight	it	provoked	in	the	summer	of	2015	is	one
illustration	of	how	unstable	this	monetary	architecture	is.	Indeed,	despite	the	advent	of	the	Federal	Reserve’s
bilateral	swap	network	and	while	Tooze	is	right	to	consider	that	French,	Chinese	and	to	a	lesser	extent	Russian
hopes	that	a	new	monetary	order	would	emerge	from	this	crisis,	were	disappointed	he	doesn’t	quite	explain	why	this
could	not	have	happened	for	instance	had	the	internationalization	of	the	RMB	not	been	fundamentally	halted	and
reversed	by	the	shock	of	2015.
The	system	is	now	precarious	in	the	fundamental	sense	that	it	is	based	on	the	Fed’s	ability	and	willingness	to
internalize	the	global	environment.	In	his	LRB	talk	with	Helen	Thompson	and	David	Runciman,	Tooze	argued	that	the
Fed	was	best	positioned	to	internalize	the	global	dimension	of	its	policy	because	of	the	policymakers	running	it	at	the
time.	The	presence	of	Stanley	Fischer	(former	IMF	chief	economist	and	former	Governor	of	the	Central	Bank	of
Israel)	for	example,	or	the	intellectual	proximity	with	U.S.	trained	economist	like	Raghuram	Rajan,	the	Governor	of
the	Reserve	Bank	of	India	from	2013-2016	is	viewed	as	having	provided	the	Federal	Reserve	with	the	necessary
international	outlook	to	understand	its	global	footprint.
But	the	notion	that	Fischer,	because	of	his	international	awareness	played	this	role	isn’t	supported	by	the	evidence.
The	true	intellectual	and	policy	forces	behind	the	decision	by	the	Federal	Reserve	to	halt	its	hiking	cycle	in
consideration	for	China	and	the	world	economy	were	Yellen,	Bill	Dudley	from	the	New	York	Fed	and	Lael	Brainard
(at	the	time	member	of	the	Federal	Open	Market	Committee	but	more	importantly	aspiring	Secretary	of	the	US
Treasury),	had	Hillary	Clinton	been	elected.	Fischer	was	in	reality	notoriously	opposed	and	stood	on	the	conservative
side	of	this	debate	by	arguing	for	the	Fed	to	keep	cool	and	carry	on	with	its	hiking	cycle.
Economic	stimulus	and	banking	system	support:	the	seeds	of	discontent
LSE Brexit: Book Review: Crashed: How a decade of financial crises changed the world by Adam Tooze (Part 1) Page 2 of 3
	
	
Date originally posted: 2018-10-12
Permalink: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/2018/10/12/book-review-crashed-how-a-decade-of-financial-crises-changed-the-world-by-adam-tooze-part-1/
Blog homepage: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/
The	Federal	Reserve	policies	undoubtedly	played	a	critical	role	in	resolving	the	global	financial	crisis.	But	they	also
contributed	to	creating	profound	rifts	in	the	political	fabric	of	America,	and	the	world.
Debates	in	the	United	States,	and	in	particular	inside	the	Obama	administration	exposed	a	deep-seated	economic,
ideological	and	political	fight	on	the	question	of	expansionary	fiscal	policy.	This	story	has	been	told	elsewhere	but	it	is
striking	to	be	reminded	of	the	heroic	role	that	Larry	Summers,	who,	for	all	his	faults,	played	a	critical	part	in	securing
a	middle	ground	that	would	certainly	be	less	ambitious	than	Christina	Romer’s	demands	for	a	bigger	fiscal	stimulus
but	far	more	appropriate	than	the	conservative	voices	in	Obama’s	White	House	and	in	Congress.
It	is	particularly	striking	to	note	how	this	fiscal	stimulus	took	place	against	the	opposition	of	a	Republican	Congress
held	hostage	by	the	growing	Tea	Party	Caucus,	which	was	reinforced	by	the	crisis.	Influential	conservative
economists	like	Martin	Feldstein,	Glenn	Hubbard	and	Ken	Rogoff	also	pressed	for	accelerated	fiscal	adjustment,	and
finally	how,	even	inside	the	Democratic	party,	conservative	voices	like	Rahm	Emanuel	or	Peter	Orszag	went	out	of
their	way	to	curb	the	fiscal	stimulus.	Finally,	this	policy	took	place	against	an	international	coalition	led	by	Angela
Merkel	and	then	George	Osborne/David	Cameron	who	would	argue	relentlessly	for	austerity.	Given	this	landscape,
the	choices	made	by	the	Obama	team,	in	particular	under	the	intellectual	leadership	of	Christina	Romer,	Obama’s
Chairwoman	of	the	Council	of	Economic	Advisors,	stands	out	as	particularly	far-sighted.	But	they	helped	fuel	a
political	rift	that	was	most	visible	in	the	debt-ceiling	debates	in	the	summer	of	2011	where	the	Tea	Party	and	the	most
fiscally	conservative	Republicans	effectively	blocked	the	Federal	Government’s	budgetary	process,	provoked	a
government	shut-down,	which	together	exposed	the	dysfunctional	nature	of	U.S.	political	system	and	would
eventually	cost	the	US	its	AAA	rating	and	some	of	its	international	standing.
On	the	issue	of	banking	sector	support,	the	record	might	be	more	mixed	and	Paul	Krugman’s	review	of	Tim
Geithner’s	book	probably	gives	the	most	balanced	view	of	this	episode	by	giving	due	credit	to	Geithner	and	former
Fed	chairman	Ben	Bernanke	for	their	plan	and	policies	of	liquidity	support	and	banking	system	recapitalization.
However,	it	is	good	to	be	reminded	that	alternatives	were	available	and	were	turned	down	by	a	combination	of
congressional	obstacles	and	certainly	class	proximity	and	elite	networks	that	linked	the	Obama	economic	team	to	the
heart	of	the	Wall	Street	complex	by	way	of	Bob	Rubin,	Larry	Summers	and	the	Hamilton	Project	(a	group	of	leading
economists	close	to	the	democratic	party	and	to	Wall	Street).
It	is	worth	recalling	an	extraordinary	New	Yorker	article	by	Ryan	Lizza,	who,	like	Tooze,	gives	an	account	of	the	days
in	late	March	2009,	when	the	Obama	economic	team	argued	over	the	possibility	of	nationalizing	most	of	the
American	banking	system	and	introduce	a	large	“bad	bank”	much	like	the	Swedish	government	did	in	the	late	1990s.
The	jury	is	still	out	on	whether	this	would	have	been	better	economic	policy,	but	it	is	more	likely	that	this	would	have
radically	tamed	the	emergence	of	the	Tea	Party	and	limited	the	perception	of	an	economic	and	political	system	that
privatizes	the	gains	and	socializes	the	losses	during	crises.	American	crisis	fighters	focused	on	the	rescue	of	the
financial	system	over	Main	Street	and	spokespersons	of	the	financial	industry	were	now	demanding	all	the
mobilization	of	the	resources	of	the	State	to	save	society’s	financial	infrastructure	(p.	165),	something	that	would
effectively	be	largely	achieved	by	October	13,	2008	with	a	$125	billion	capital	injection	in	the	nine	largest	U.S.	banks.
While	there	are	questions	about	whether	an	alternative	policy	in	the	United	States	could	have	led	to	better	economic
outcomes,	there	is	clear	evidence	that	this	crisis	and	its	policy	response	fractured	the	political	system	and	opened
the	way	to	two	insurgent	forces	on	the	left	and	right	that	largely	explain	the	state	of	the	U.S.	political	system	today:
The	Tea	Party,	of	which	Donald	Trump	is	the	prime	heir,	emerged	in	response	to	the	Obama	fiscal	expansion	and
the	perception	of	a	runaway	expansion	and	bureaucratic	elite.	At	the	same	time,	the	Occupy	Wall	Street	movement
brought	together	forces	on	the	left	that	resented	the	bailing	out	of	the	financial	system	at	the	public’s	expense	and
would	come	to	fuel	division	inside	the	Democratic	Party	and	would	later	propel	the	candidacy	of	Bernie	Sanders.
While	this	narrative	and	the	immediate	link	between	the	economic	crisis	and	politics	can	be	overly	simplistic,	there	is
something	to	say	about	how	the	polarization	of	U.S.	politics	today,		owes	a	great	deal	to	the	transatlantic	financial
crisis	and	the	way	in	which	the	U.S.	government	chose	to	resolve	it.
This	post	gives	the	views	of	the	author,	and	not	the	position	of	the	LSE	Brexit	blog,	or	of	the	London	School	of
Economics.	Image:	CC0	Public	Domain.
Shahin	Vallée	is	a	PhD	candidate	at	the	LSE’s	European	Institute.
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